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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A FEDERAL ANTI-
LYNCHING BILL
By HON. L. C. DYER AND GEORGE C. DYER
It is not the purpose of the writers of this article to deal with the
political aspects of the anti-lynching bill which for a number of ses-
sions has been pending in Congress. However, it will be necessary to
point out briefly the existence of a need for this legislation and its his-
torical development to provide a background for an analysis of the legal
problems involved.
For over fifty years the crime of lynching has been going on in this
country, and only unsatisfactory results have been effected by responsi-
ble state authorities in attempting to check it. Either because of the
neglect or inability of the states in prosecuting the mobs, which time
after time have gone unpunished, has a necessity for some sort of fed-
eral regulation arisen. President Wilson, President Harding, and
President Coolidge have all at various times stressed the importance of
solving the problem of mob violence. Accurate figures of lynching are
not obtainable, because many cases go unreported and are unknown out-
side the locality; but available figures show that in a large degree the
efforts of the mobs have been directed against negroes. Since 1885,
there have been 3221 negroes lynched and only 1045 white victims of
mob violence. In 1927 all of those killed at the hands of lynchers were
negroes. 1 Our heterogenous populace claims some 12,000,000 colored
people and it must be admitted that their rights, guaranteed by the Con-
stitution of the United States, are just as sacred as those of any person.
It is highly incumbent upon our government to see to it that these rights
are properly protected. If that protection is adequately given by the
states individually, the matter need not be dealt with by Congress, but
such has not been the case.
In 1926, when thirty persons were lynched, twenty-one were taken
from officers and jails, and in 1927 twelve of the sixteen persons
lynched were taken from the hands of the law.2 Lynchings are often
carried on with unbelievable cruelty and it is known that several inno-
cent persons have been victims of this mob control. In 1926 one man
was killed after the courts had acquitted him of the alleged crime.8
World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1928, p. 327. The "FoRuM," March,
1928, pp. 475-6.
'The "FoRum," March, 1928, pp. 475-6, summarizing a report submitted by
the Tuskeegee Institute. 'World Almanac, supra.
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Very few of the offenders have been discovered and prosecuted by the
state officials. In only four instances in 1926, when thirty persons were
lynched, were persons charged with being connected with lynchings in-
dicted. Although there have been 4,266 lynchings in the United States
since 1885, according to the Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People, in less than two dozen cases have guilty persons been prose-
cuted. To bring an end to such a deplorable condition, it is necessary
that some authority based upon a broader public opinion should be
brought into play. A bill now before Congress attempts to do this. It
provides in brief that when a lynching is perpetrated and the state or
county officers do not make reasonable efforts to prevent it or to pun-
ish the offenders, these officers shall be guilty of felony and upon con-
viction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years,
a fine of not over $5,000, or both; that if the suspected parties to a
lynching are not apprehended because of the neglect of state or county
officers or if their trial is not likely, because of prejudice on the part of
obtainable jurors, to result in conviction of those guilty, the federal
court of the district shall have jurisdiction to try and to punish them ac-
cording to state law; and that any county which is the scene of a lynch-
ing shall forfeit $10,000 to the United States, recoverable in the district
court.'
It has been said that the passage of a bill of this type will lead to un-
due centralization of governmental power and an undue interference
with the sovereign rights of the states. However, the bill seems to re-
veal on its face that this fear is nQt well founded; for, except in the
matter of fining the county, the measure specifically gives the states
every opportunity and incentive to deal with the menace of mob violence
before the Federal authority and power are brought to bear. The con-
tention that the proposed legislation is unconstitutional because it is an
exercise of the police power, which has been reserved to the states, can-
not be sustained. Long ago the case of Gibbons v. Ogden' laid down
the doctrine that the Federal government, in the exercise of an express
power, may use any appropriate power, even though in other connec-
tions such power has been reserved to the states. The Federal govern-
'The full text of the bill is set forth in House Rep. 71, 68 Cong., First Ses-
sion, pp. 16-17.
'9 Wheat. 204. See also, Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S.
196, 29 L. Ed. 158, 5 Sup. Ct. 826; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 57
L. Ed. 523, 33 Sup. Ct. 281; Wilson v. United States, 232 U. S. 563, 58 L. Ed.
728, 34 Sup. Ct. 347; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 64
L. Ed. 194, 40 Sup. Ct. 106.
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ment, in the exercise of an express power, may, therefore, exercise a
power very similar to the police power of the states.
It is the purpose of this article to deal with the constitutionality of the
proposed anti-lynching bill under the particular clauses of the first sec-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, which read:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any persons within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
The Supreme Court has on many different occasions pointed out -that
the fourteenth amendment constitutes a guaranty to each person within
the jurisdiction of the several states that he shall be accorded certain
fundamental rights. In Strander v. West Virginia,0 the plaintiff,
Strauder, a colored man, was indicted for murder and upon trial was
convicted and sentenced, and his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the State. The case was taken to the United States Supreme
Court on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of West Virginia, the
chief assignment of error being that the prisoner was convicted with-
out due process of law since the laws of West Virginia excluded the
members of his race from jury service. The court held the state
statute unreasonably discriminatory and a denial of the equal protec-
tion of the laws within the meaning of the first section of the fourteenth
amendment. The court said:
This [the fourteenth amendment] is one of a series of constitu-
tional provisions serving a common purpose; namely, securing to a
race recently emancipated all the civil rights that the superior race
enjoy. It was in view of these considerations that the 14th amend-
ment was framed and adopted. It was designed to assure to the
colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law
are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protec-
tion of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it
should be denied by the states. It not only gave citizenship and
the privilege of citizenship to persons of color, but it denied to any
state the power to withhold from them the equal protection of the
laws, and authorized Congress to enforce its provisions by appro-
priate legislation. The fourteenth amendment makes no attempt
to enumerate the rights it designed to protect. Its language is pro-
hibitory; but every prohibition implies the existence of rights and
immunities, prominent among which is an immunity from inequality
-100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664.
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of legal protection, either for life, liberty, or property. A right
or an immunity, whether created by the Constitution, or only
guaranteed by it, even without any express delegation of power,
may be protected by Congress.
The fourteenth amendment adds nothing to the rights of one citizen
as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against
any encroachment by the states on the fundamental rights which belong
to every citizen as a member of society. Not only is the right of the
equal protection of the laws recognized in the fourteenth amendment,
but it is a right essential to the very nature of our government. The
equality of the right of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every
republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens by
securing adherence to this principle, if within its power. That duty was
originally assumed by the states and it still remains there. The only
obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the states do not
deny the right. This the amendment secures but no more. The power
of the national government is limited to the enforcement of this
guaranty.7
In a discussion of the Constitutionality of this bill under the clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids the abridging by the state of
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States it is rather
difficult to ascertain vhat are the privileges and immunities which are
inherent in citizens of the United States. Fortunately, we are not with-
out judicial construction on this point. The leading case on the sub-
ject is the Slaughter House Cases.' The Supreme Court had no hesita-
tion in confining the expressions "privileges and immunities" to those
which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free
governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of
the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their
becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
rights are, it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They
may all, however, be comprehended under the following general heads:
protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety,
subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the whole government may
prescribe for the general good of the whole. Earlier cases are Ward
v. Maryland,9 and Paul v. Virginia.10 Protection by the government
'United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588; Civil Rights Cases,
109 U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 Sup. Ct. 8.816 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394.
'12 Wallace 418, 20 L. Ed. 449. 8 Wallace 168, 19 L. Ed. 357.
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and especially equal protection is a right which every citizen is entitled
to enjoy.
Those rights and immunities which have been created by the Con-
stitution of the United States or which are dependent for their existence
upon that Constitution can be protected by Congress and it has the
power in the legitimate exercise of its legislative discretion to determine
for itself the form and manner of protection which it desires to in-
voke." Congress, therefore, is the sole repository of the responsi-
bility as guarantor of the fundamental rights previously referred to.
The specific right which the proposed anti-lynching bill attempts to en-
force is, in the words of the leading case of Barbier v. Connoly,22 "that
equal protection and security be given to all under like circumstances in
the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights." Section 5 of the
fourteenth amendmentla further directly empowers Congress to enforce
the provision by appropriate legislation.
An examination of the facts shows that there has been and is now a
two-fold denial of the equal protection of the law resulting from the
existence of the lynching evil: the failure to afford protection to the
victim, and the failure to prosecute the guilty parties. In the first place,
the failure to afford protection is equivalent to a denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws. Equal protection requires equal treatment of all
persons and classes by each agency of the state in the exercise of its
function. It requires not only equality in the law itself but also equality
of administration. The doctrine that the denial of rights recognized
by the fourteenth amendment need not be by legislation was laid down
by the Supreme Court in Saunders v. Shaw.'4
In Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Bosworth,'5 the court defined the
phrase, "denial of the equal protection of the laws," to mean a refusal to
grant or a withholding of equal treatment. The essence of the four-
teenth amendment, therefore, is to forbid discrimination and to require
equal treatment on the part of each department of the state in the exer-
cise of its particular function, and its effect is to empower and make it
"United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. Ed. 478; In Re Quarles, 158
U. S. 532, 39 L. Ed. 1080, 15 Sup. Ct. 959; Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Pet.
539, 1. c. 619, 10 L. Ed. 1060; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 1. c. 419,
4 L. Ed. 579.
113 U. S. 27, 28 L. Ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. 357.
""The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation the
provisions of this article."
"244 U. S. 310, 61 L. Ed. 1160, 37 Sup. Ct. 640.
"230 Fed. 191, 207.
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incumbent upon the courts, state and federal, to prevent discrimination
and to secure equal treatment. 6  In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,' an officer
who had the right to license laundries refused to license Chinese, and it
was held that the conviction of Yick Wo for operating a laundry with-
out a license was void. The court said:
Whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted,
they are applied by the public authorities charged with their
administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a mind
so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the
State of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the
petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign pro-
visions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face and im-
partial in appearance, yet if it is applied and administered by pub-
lic authority with an evil eye and unequal hand so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
This fundamental principle has been further enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Ex parte Virginia,8 Chy Ling v. Freeman,9 Soon Hing
v. Crowley,20 Henderson v. Mayor of New York,2 1 Ex parte Young,22
and Neal v. Delaware.2"
As noted above, the failure to prosecute those who take part in lynch-
ings is the second form of denial of the equal protection of the laws to
the victims. By failing to prosecute the wrongdoers, the officials are
denying to those who may be subject to similar outrages that protection
which comes from the punishment of crime. It is generally acknowl-
edged that the purpose of criminal law enforcement is not merely the
punishment which is meted out to the individuals-not merely an "eye
for an eye or a tooth for a tooth"-but is the prevention of others from
committing similar outrages on society. Hence, when a state provides
the means for and does prosecute those who do not conform to its other
laws, but persistently fails to prosecute persons guilty of mob murder,
it would seem that those who, because of race, are especially in danger
of mob violence have been denied the equal protection of the laws.
State and county officers do not attempt to suppress this crime as they
"Terrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519, 47 L. Ed. 572, 23 Sup. Ct. 402.118 U. S. 356, 30 L. Ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064.
100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676.
"92 U. S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 550.
"113 U. S. 703, 28 L. Ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. 730.
"92 U. S. 259, 23 L. Ed. 543.
209 U. S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 Sup. Ct. 441.
103 U. S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567.
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do other offenses, and this lax inequality of protection is the very heart
of mob violence. Mr. Charles C. Hyde forcefully remarks in regard
to the lynching of foreign subjects by American mobs :24 "A denial
of justice has usually been apparent, for the offending circumstances
have commonly revealed gross neglect on the part of local authorities
either to prevent what occurred or to prosecute the wrongdoers." In
United States v. Blackburn,25 we find in the charge to the jury that "by
equal protection of the laws, spoken of in the indictment, is meant that
the ordinary means and appliances which the law has provided shall be
used and put in operation in all cases of violation of law. Hence, if
the outrages and crimes shown to have been committed in the case be-
fore you were well known to the community at large, and that com-
munity and the officers of the law wilfully failed to employ the means
provided by law to ferret out and bring to trial the offenders because of
the victims being colored, it is depriving them of the equal protection
of the law." Hence we see there is a denial of equal protection, not
only to victims of the mob violence, but also to the race in danger of
mob violence and who suffer as a result of inadequate and inefficient
law enforcement.
To summarize, it may be said that it is state action of a particular
character that is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment.
It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all state
legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them
in life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or which denies
to any of them the equal protection of the laws. It not only does this,
but in order that the national will, thus declared, may not be a mere
brutum fulwen, the last section of the amendment invests Congress
with power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. It does not in-
vest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within
the domain of state legislation, but simply gives it power to provide
modes of relief against state legislation or state inaction of the kind
referred to. Until some state law has been passed, or some state
action through officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights
of citizens sought to be protected by the fourteenth amendment, no
legislation of the United States under said amendment nor any proceed-
ing under such legislation, can be called into activity; for the prohibi-
" International Law as applied by U. S. (1922) Vol. 1, pp. 516-522.
"Fed. Case, No. 14,603.
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tions of the amendment are against state laws and acts done under state
authority. Of course, legislation may, and should be, provided in ad-
vance to meet the exigency when it arises.28  The authority vested in
Congress to pass "corrective" or "remedial" legislation is the authority
from which the anti-lynching bill emanates.
Many of the provisions of the measure relate to actions directed
against neglectful state and municipal officers. Thus it is provided that
the state or municipal officers who fail in their duty shall be criminally
liable .2  The fourteenth amendment operates not only as to the state
in its entirety but with equal force on the officials of its subdivisions.
It is doubtless true that a state may act through different agencies, either
by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and the pro-
hibitions of the amendment extend to all action of the state denying
equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these agen-
cies or by another. The Constitutional provision, therefore, must mean
that no agency of the state or officers or agents by whom its powers are
exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.28
In Raymond v. Chicago Traction Company,29 the Supreme Court
said: "The provisions of the fourteenth amendment are not confined to
the action of the state through its legislature or through the executive
or judicial authority. Those provisions relate to and cover all of the
instrumentalities by which the state acts, and so it has been held that,
whoever by public position under a state government deprives another
of any right protected by that amendment against deprivation by the
state, violates the constitutional inhibition." Hence we see that it has
"Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 Sup. Ct. 1M
'Sec. 3, par. 1: "Any state or municipal officer charged with the duty or
who possesses the power or authority as such officer to protect the life of any
person that may be put to death by any mob or riotous assemblage, or who
has any such person in his charge as a prisoner, who fails, neglects, or re-
fuses to make all reasonable efforts to prevent such person from being so
put to death, or any state or municipal officer charged with the duty of appre-
hending or prosecuting any person participating in such mob or riotous as-
semblage who fails, neglects, or refuses to make all reasonable efforts to per-
form his duty in apprehending or prosecuting to final judgment under the
laws of such state all persons so participating except such, if any, as are or
have been held for such participation in any district court of the United States,
as herein provided, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof
shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding five years or by a fine of not
exceeding $5,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
"Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 1. c. 318, 25 L. Ed. 667; Ex parte Virginia,
100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676; Home Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U. S. 278, 57 L. Ed. 510, 33 Sup. Ct 312.
"207 U. S. 20, 1. c. 35, 52 L. Ed. 78, 28 Sup. Ct. 7.
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been well settled by our courts that the amendment applies with full
weight to the most obscure in the states' government machine.
It has been equally well settled that the Federal Government in en-
forcing the equal protection of the laws can act directly upon those
holding public office whose official acts of neglect or wanton failure
constitute the denial of the constitutional right of equal protection.
In Ex parte Virginia," the petitioner was arrested and held in custody
under an indictment found against him in the District Court of the
United States for the Western District of Virginia. The indictment
alleged that he, being a judge of the county court of Pittsylvania County
of that state, and an officer charged by law with the selection of jurors
to serve in the circuit and county courts of said county in the year 1878,
'did then and there exclude and fail to select as jurors certain negro
citizens of said county, solely on account of their race, color, and pre-
vious condition of servitude. The petitioner, being in custody, pre-
sented his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of certiorari
to bring up the record of the District Court. The court held the act of
Congress, under which the petitioner was convicted, constitutional and
denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court said: "Con-
gress is authorized to enforce the prohibition by appropriate legislation.
. . . Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry
out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to en-
force submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all
persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and equal pro-
tection of the laws against state denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of Congressional power . . . such legis-
lation must act upon persons not upon the abstract thing denominated the
state, but upon the persons who are the agents of the state in the denial
of the rights which were intended to be secured."
Another question immediately arises out of the proposition just re-
lated, i. e., whether or not the fourteenth amendment can reach the acts
of state officers if they are not within the scope of the power conferred
upon them by the state. Under this amendment the Federal Judicial
power can redress and punish wrongs committed by a state official
whether he has misused the authority given him or not. The state acts
and becomes responsible when it places an official in the position by rea-
son of which he is able to withhold protection or prosecution. It is
entirely irrelevant to inquire into authorization by the state of the
commission of the wrong. The amendment applies to every person
" 100 U. S. 339, 1. c. 345-47, 25 L. Ed. 676.
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whether natural or judicial, who is the repository of state power. The
settled construction of the amendment is that it presupposes the possi-
bility of an abuse by a state officer or representative of his powers and
that it deals with such a contingency.
This point was decided in Home Telegraph & Telephone Company v.
Los Angeles.31 In this case Los Angeles had passed a confiscatory
ordinance, in violation of the Constitution of California and of the
fourteenth amendment. It was contended that the action of the city as
not within the limits of its authorization was not state action. The
court held the contrary and said the fourteenth amendment "provides
for a case where one who is in the possession of state power uses that
power to commit some wrong which by the amendment is forbidden,
even though the consummation of the wrong may not be within the
powers possessed if the commission of the wrong itself is rendered pos-
sible or is efficiently aided by the state authority lodged in the wrong-
doer." The amendment contemplates the possibility of state officers
abusing the powers conferred upon them by doing wrongs prohibited by
the amendment.
By the unanimous opinion of the judges in the case of Logan v.
U. S.,32 the law may be regarded as established that Congress has the
power of protecting by proper legislation all rights and privileges given
or guaranteed by the Constitution. The character and type of the
right will determine the method employed. The object may be attained
by regulatory means, by the imposition of penalties, or by the authoriz-
ing of suits by the injured party, or it may be by all of these together.
One method of enforcement may be applicable to one fundamental right
and not applicable to another."3
In the light of the decisions rendered and the construction of the
fourteenth amendment by the courts as given in the foregoing discus-
sion, the provisions of the bill as to the criminal liability of the states'
officers seem to be in harmony with the Constitution.
The next section to be considered is that which provides that mem-
bers of a mob who conspire with officials to lynch any person are guilty
of a felony.3' To sustain the constitutionality of these particular parts
'1227 U. S. 278, 57 L. Ed. 510, 33 Sup. Ct. 312.
144 U. S. 263, 36 L. Ed. 429, 12 Sup. Ct. 617.
U. S. v. Cruickshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588.
Sec. 3, par. 2: "Any state or municipal officer, acting as such officer under
authority of state law, having in his custody or control a prisoner, who shall
conspire, combine, or confederate with any person to put such prisoner to
death without authority of law as a punishment for some alleged public offense,
shall be guilty of a felony, and those who so conspire, combine, or confederate
with such officer shall likewise be punished by imprisonment for life or not
less than five years."
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it is only necessary to apply the principles of law relating to conspiracies.
All conspirators are regarded as principals. Hence, the United States
can reach the individuals who took part in the lynchings even though
they would not be amenable to federal powers if there had been no
active conspiracy with state officials. Sec. 5440 of the Revised Statutes
as amended by Act May 17, 1879, c. 8, 21 Stat. 4,85 reads as follows:
"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offenses against
the United States or to defraud the United States in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable
to a penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars or to imprisonment
for not more than two years or to both fine and imprisonment in the
discretion of the court." In United States v. Lyman,80 the court held
that to constitute the crime of conspiracy, the object of the unlawful
agreement must be the commission of some offense against the United
States in the sense only that it must be some act made an offense by
the laws of the United States. Hence, since the Anti-Lynching Bill,
in its provisions relating to state officers, makes those that conspire with
the lynchers guilty of a felony, it seems clear that any conspirators with
state officials who are made criminally liable under the proposed bill can
themselves be made criminally liable thereunder. Upon the same prin-
ciple an act providing punishment for any two or more persons con-
spiring to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was held constitutional.8 7
Congress, as has been pointed out, may enforce the prohibitions of
the fourteenth amendment whenever they are disregarded by either the
legislative, the executive, or the judicial department of a state. The
mode of enforcement is left to its discretion. It may enforce the pro-
hibition by authorizing the removal of a case from a state court in
which it is disregarded into a federal court where it will be enforced.
Of this there can be no reasonable doubt. Removal of cases from
state courts into courts of the United States has been an acknowledged
mode of protecting rights ever since the foundation of government. Its
constitutionality has never been seriously doubted. A cause may be re-
moved from a state to a federal court where it arises under the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States as well as where it arises be-
U. S. C., Tit. 18, sec. 88.
188 U. S. 445, 47 L. Ed. 539, 23 Sup. Ct. 349.
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. Ed. 274, 4 Sup. Ct. 152; U. S. v.
Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, 28 L. Ed. 673, 5 Sup. Ct. 35; Motes v. U. S. 178 U. S.
458, 44 L. Ed. 1150, 20 Sup. Ct. 993.
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tween citizens of different states, and it is for Congress to say at what
time the right shall be invoked and at what stage of the proceedings a
case may be removed. Congress may authorize removal before or after
judgment and regulate the method, and it may prescribe a rule of limita-
tions for removal which shall be binding on both state and federal
courts.38
The provisions in Section 5 of the bill for a fine upon the county in
which a lynching takes places find ample precedent. The policy of im-
posing liability upon a civil subdivision of government exercising dele-
gated police power is familiar to every student of the commow law. It
is recognized in the beginning of the police system of Anglo-Saxon peo-
ple. The hundred, a very early form of subdivision, was held answer-
able for robberies committed within its boundaries. By a series of
statutes beginning possibly in 1285, in the Statutes of Win-
chester,39 coming on down to the 27th Elizabeth, c. 13, the
Riot Act of George 1,40 and the act of 8 George II, c. 16, we find a
continuous recognition of the principle that a civil subdivision entrusted
with the duty of protecting property in its midst and with police power
to discharge the function, may be made answerable not only for negli-
gence affirmatively shown, but absolutely as not having afforded a pro-
tection adequate to the obligation. The inflicting of a penalty on a
county where a lynching occurs, is an appropriate method of enforcing
the provisions of the bill; for the county is a political subdivision of a
state created for the purpose and charged with the duty of enforcing the
law. It is that part of the state which is guilty of failure to enforce
the fourteenth amendment when a person has been killed by a mob.
Statutes of a similar character have been enacted by several of the states
and held valid exertions of the police power.4" The Supreme Court of
the United States in Chicago v. SturgiS,42 has also upheld the validity
of such penalties. The duties and obligations thus entrusted to the local
subordinate government is by this enactment emphasized and enforced
" Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 406, 25 L. Ed. 206; Gaines v. Fuentes,
92 U. S. 10, 23 L. Ed. 524; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 1. c. 350, 4 L. Ed.
97.
U13 Edw. I, C. 1.
1 Geo. I, C. 1.
"Darlington v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 31 N. Y. 164; Faubia v. New Orleans,
20 La. Ann. 410; Dale County v. Gunter, 46 Ala. 111; De Kalb v. Smith, 47
Ala. 407; Countey Y. Clarendon County, 101 S. C. 141, 85 S. E. 228; Brown v.
Orangeburg Co., 55 S. C. 45, 32 S. E. 764; Atchinson v. Terine, 9 Kan. 350;
P. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 242 ll. 178, 89 N. E. 1022; Commissioners
v. Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50; County of Allegheny v. Gibson, etc.,
90 Pa. St. 397.
222 U. S. 313, 56 L. Ed. 215, 32 Sup. Ct. 92.
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by imposing upon the local community absolute liability for losses of
life, liberty, or property resulting from the violence of such public
tumults. The validity of the section of the anti-lynching bill providing
for the imposition of fines is certain.
The authority for the constitutional validity of Section 7 of the bill,
dealing with mob violence against foreigners,4 3 is found in the treaty
power of the Federal Government. The power of Congress to make
all laws "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the powers
vested in the government of the United States includes the power to
enact such legislation as is appropriate to give effect to any stipulations
which it is competent for the President, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, to insert in a treaty with a foreign power.44 Ob-
viously, when the United States has accepted toward foreign powers
responsibility for the acts or omissions of local state agents, it should
be given power to act directly against those taking part in lynchings,
when, as has been shown, the agents in the various localities have proven
themselves unable or unwilling to do so. This section of the bill is con-
stitutional independently of the fourteenth amendment.
In Moore v. Demnpsey 45 the case went to the Supreme Court on an ap-
peal from an order dismissing a writ of habeas corpus, the ground of
the petition for the writ being that the proceedings in the state court
of Arkansas, whereby the appellants, five negroes, were convicted of
murder, although a trial in form, were such only in form, and that the
appellants were hurried to conviction under the pressure of a mob
without any regard for their rights and without due process of law.
The court reversed the order and restored the writ of habeas corpus,
holding that the district court must determine whether the facts alleged
as to the trial being dominated by the mob were true. Mr. Justice
Holmes said:
"In Frank v. Mangum,4" it was recognized of course, that if in
fact a trial is dominated by a mob so that there is an actual inter-
" "Any act committed in any State or Territory of the United States in
violation of the rights of a citizen or subject of a foreign country secured to
such citizen or subject by treaty between the United States and such foreign
country, which act constitutes a crime under the laws of such state or terri-
tory, shall constitute a like crime against the peace and dignity of the United
States, punishable in like manner as in the courts of said state or territory,
and within the period limited by the laws of such state or territory, and may
be prosecuted in the courts of the United States, and upon conviction the
sentence executed in like manner as sentences upon conviction for crimes under
the laws of the United States."
" Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 1. c. 121, 45 L. Ed. 448, 21 Sup. Ct. 302.
"1261 U. S. 86, 67 L. Ed. 543, 43 Sup. Ct. 265.
" 237 U. S. 309, 1. c. 335, 59 L. Ed. 969, 35 Sup. Ct. 582.
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ference with the course of justice, there is a departure from due
process of law; and that if the state, supplying no corrective pro-
cess, carries into execution a judgment of death or imprisonment
based upon a verdict thus produced by mob domination, the State
deprives the accused of his life or liberty without due process of
law. We assume in accordance with that case that the corrective
process supplied by the State may be so adequate that interference
by habeas corpus ought not to be allowed. It certainly is true that
mere mistakes of law in the course of a trial are not to be corrected
in that way. But if the case is that the whole proceeding is a
mask-that counsel, jury, and judge were swept to the fatal end by
an irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State courts
failed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in the machinery for
correction nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no
other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob can pre-
vent this court from securing to the petitioners their constitutional
rights."
This recent case is important because it shows that the Federal courts
will act to preserve and make good to injured parties their constitutional
rights under the fourteenth amendment. Likewise, it is quite reason-
able to suppose that the courts actuated by the same principles, will up-
hold as appropriate legislation a law designed to safeguard the rights
afforded by the amendment.
The foregoing argument shows that the bill under discussion, designed
to "insure the equal protection of the laws and to punish the crime of
lynching," is "appropriate" legislation within the meaning of the fifth
section of the fourteenth amendment and is that form of "corrective"
or "remedial" legislation which is authorized by the wilful or negli-
gent failure of the states or their officials to conform to the prohibitions
of the fourteenth amendment.
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